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Legal Implications of Epilepsy
H. Richard Beresford
Department of Neurology, North Shore University Hospital, Manhasset, and Department of Neurology, Cornell
University Medical College, New York, New York, U.S.A.

Summary: Physicians who care for patients with epilepsy
may function as agents or targets of social control. As
agents, they may assist in the identification and control
of epileptic drivers, may provide information that enables
fair and appropriate job placements for epileptic persons,
and give testimony that helps the legal system resolve
issues relating to the liability of epileptic persons for harm
attributed to seizures or interictal behavioral disturbances. As targets, they may be charged with negligent
failure to diagnose, treat, or inform about epilepsy or its

associated problems, with failure to exercise due care in
protecting persons harmed by their patients, or with failure to preserve confidentialityof medical information. Although legislation and judicial decisions have defmed
some of the physician’s legal duties with reasonable clarity, areas of uncertainty remain, particularly regarding the
issue of violating medical confidentiality for the benefit
of persons other than the patient. Key Words: EpilepsyAutomobile driving-Confidentiality.

Epilepsy has dimensions that generate a variety
of legal problems. Because a person may experience
sudden and abrupt loss of consciousness, there is a
risk of harm both to the person and others affected
by his or her loss of control (Spudis et al., 1986;
Gastaut and Zifkin, 1987). Ictal events or interictal
disturbances may disrupt cognitive or affective processes in more subtle ways than frank unconsciousness and some resulting behaviors may be antisocial
(Stevens, 1975; Waxman and Geschwind, 1975;
Ashford et al., 1980; Pritchard et al., 1980). Treatment itself may compromise neurological functions
in ways that lead to injury to patients or others, or
cause damage to extraneural or fetal tissues (Rosenbaum, 1982; Dalessio, 1985). Stigmatizing persons with epilepsy may lead to discrimination and
other unjust social responses. Thus, physicians who
care for persons with epilepsy can expect to interact
with the legal system in one context or another.
One view of law is that it is a system of social
control designed to protect interests of both individuals and the larger community. In this framework, a physician may be either an agent or a target
of social control. As an agent, the physician protects

patients from harm, protects others from risks
posed by patients, and contributes expertise that
helps the legal system resolve disputes that involve
medical questions. A physician becomes a target
when aggrieved persbns claim that he or she wrongfully harmed or failed to protect them, or when state
agencies assert violations of particular laws or regulations (such as those relating to the care of persons
with epilepsy ar other disorders marked by paroxysmal impairment of neurologic functions). This
paper will consider selected aspects of the physician’s role as agent or target of social control, emphasizing particular cases that illustrate how the
legal system attempts to define, balance, and protect interests of epileptics, their physicians, and
other members of society. No effort will be made
to survey the gamut of legal problems persons with
epilepsy may encounter or to catalogue the large
body of state and federal law that pertains to epilepsy.

Address correspondence and reprint requests to Dr. H. R.
Beresford at Department of Neurology, North Shore University
Hospital, Community Drive, Manhasset, NY 11030, U S A .
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PHYSICIAN AS AGENT OF SOCIAL CONTROL
The epileptic driver
Driving as an antisocial act
In People v Decina (1956), New York’s highest
court upheld a charge of criminal negligence against
a defendant who had a seizure while driving, lost

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EPILEPSY

control of his car, and struck and killed four children. The defendant had had seizures for 9 years,
probably the result of a brain abscess that had been
surgically removed several years before the onset
of epilepsy. At the time of the accident, he was taking antiepileptic drugs and had had no seizures for
9 months. In upholding the validity of the criminal
indictment, the court reasoned that his conduct in
operating an automobile knowing he might unexpectedly lose consciousness constituted culpable indifference to the rights of others. The court ordered
a new trial, however, ruling that the trial judge had
erred in allowing testimony by a resident physician
who had evaluated the defendant after the accident
and had obtained the history of his previous seizures. The court viewed this as confidential information that could not be disclosed without the consent of the patient since it was obtained while the
defendant was receiving medical care. In other
words, the court recognized that an individual’s interest in medical privacy is sufficiently strong to restrict nonconsensual disclosures about his condition
in a legal proceeding. Three disSentingjudges would
have dismissed the case entirely on the ground that
a person who is unconscious because of a seizure
cannot be said to act with criminal intent.
This troubling case underscores the social control
function of law in its emphasis on preventing conduct that endangers society, such as risking loss of
control of a vehicle. The physician who cares for a
patient with epilepsy serves this function by prescribing appropriate antiepileptic drugs, counseling
about the risks of driving, and meeting formal reporting requirements aimed at identifying potentially dangerous drivers. The case also highlights the
medical ethical principle that the confidentiality of
communications between physician and patient
should be protected unless the patient consents to
disclosure, and the court’s reasoning is consistent
with the recent Massachusetts decision in Alberts v
Devine (1985) that affirms the legal duty of physicians to protect confidentiality of communications
from patients. As will be seen, this tension between
duty to society and duty to patient may disturb the
relationship between physicians and epileptic patients ‘whodrive (Masland, 1978; Gregory, 1980).
Reporting laws
All states seek to regulate driving by persons with
epilepsy (Epilepsy Foundation of America,
1 9 8 5 ~ ~ Restrictions
).
on licensure vary widely.
Some states require seizure-free intervals for specified periods before driving is lawful, while others
permit driving based on a physician’s statement that
a patient’s epilepsy will not prevent safe operation
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of a vehicle. In either situation, medical evaluations
are required before driving is permitted provided
that the licensing agency learns that an applicant
has epilepsy. The agency may obtain this information from the applicant, the applicant’s physician,
or from a police or other official report disclosing
the possibility of a seizure disorder. Most states impose a duty on applicants to disclose medical conditions relevant to driving, including epilepsy, and
do not require physicians to report their epileptic
patients to the licensing agency. Laws of a few
states mandate reports by physicians but differ in
what they require and what penalties they impose
for failure to report. These laws generally immunize
physicians against liability for reporting that complies with formal regulatory requirements (Gregory,
1980; Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1985~).
The regulatory approaches of two states, Connecticut and New York, illustrate the contrasting
strategies of mandatory reporting by persons with
epilepsy and physician-initiated reporting.
New York requires the applicant who “has ever
suffered loss of consciousness” to submit “proof of
fitness’’ to drive. This may take the form of a physician’s statement that the applicant has had no loss
of consciousness during the previous 12 months,
that any loss of consciousness was due only to an
adjustment of medications, or that the applicant is
capable of “safe operation” of a motor vehicle. If
the applicant provides such a statement and a medical consultant to the motor vehicle agency concurs,
the agency may license the applicant. If no “proof
of fitness” is provided, licensure may be denied or
suspended after a hearing in which the applicant
may present evidence that he can safely operate a
motor vehicle (New York Code of Rules and Regulations, 1987). This approach provides flexibility
because it permits driving by persons who may have
had seizures in the year preceding the license application if their physicians believe it is safe for them
to drive. It also affords applicants the opportunity
for a hearing to demonstrate their suitability for licensure. Once granted, a license may be suspended
any time a person poses an “immediate hazard.”
Evidence of such a hazard may include a physician’s
opinion or evidence from other sources (e.g., police
report) that a particular motor vehicle accident resulted from a seizure. While laws of several other
states also require that applicants for licensure disclose seizures or other impairments of consciousness and relieve physicians from primary responsibility for reporting a diagnosis of epilepsy to a
licensing agency, many impose requirements of
specified seizure-free intervals as a condition of licensure and do not permit licensing of applicants
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only on the basis of a physician’s opinion that it is
safe for them to drive.
Connecticut statutes (1979)require a physician to
report “immediately” to the state health department the identity of a person “known to him to be
subject to recurrent attacks of epilepsy . . . or to
recurrent periods of unconsciousness uncontrolled
by medical treatment.” The health department then
must transmit this information to the motor vehicle
agency if the person is 16 years of age or older. The
agency must protect the confidentiality of the information and use it only to determine eligibility for
licensure. A medical advisory board assists the
agency in its licensing decisions. No data provided
by physicians can be used as evidence at a trial without the person’s consent, and physicians who report
as prescribed by law are provided immunity from
liability for reporting that is in “good faith, nonnegligent, and non-malicious.” A few other states
require reporting by physicians, including California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and
provide immunity to those who report (Gregory,
1980; Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1985~).
Modest fines are provided for failure to report, but
Pennsylvania law would expressly permit a finding
of negligence against a physician who fails to report
an epileptic driver who later has a motor vehicle
accident (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1 9 8 5 ~ ) .
Despite universality of laws requiring some sort
of reporting to state agencies, the degree of compliance by either persons with epilepsy or their physicians is uncertain. Anecdotal reports of noncompliance are common, and it seems safe to assume
that state agencies license persons whom the agencies don’t know have epilepsy, or that, if they know
of the epilepsy, are not informed about seizures that
might evoke restrictions on licensure. A study of 50
adult males with epilepsy supports this assumption
(Quaglieri, 1977). Thirty-five lived in states that require disclosure by persons with epilepsy to licensing agencies. In this group, 86% did not report even
though 74% knew that the law required them to report, and 58% denied they had been told by their
physicians that they had any duty to report. Fourteen percent told their physicians they had had one
or more seizures while driving. Whether this striking degree of noncompliance is prevalent is unclear,
but it suggests that many persons who know they
have epilepsy, and whose physicians know they
have epilepsy, operate motor vehicles without formal restrictions on licensure. Some legal risks of
failing to report are self-evident: loss of licensure,
fines, criminal prosecution, claims for property
damage, or injury. Less evident are the risks to

those who do not have a statutory or other mandated
duty to report. As to physicians, these risks will be
considered later in this report.
Epilepsy and employment
Epilepsy as a disqualihing condition
For the majority of persons with epilepsy whose
seizures are well controlled and who are neurologically unimpaired, no rational basis exists for restricting vocational opportunities. Yet employers
continue to fire or refuse to hire epileptic persons
without regard to clinical facts, and laws designed
to deter such actions have met with only limited
success (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 19856).
Nevertheless, with improved public education
about epilepsy and advances in pharmacotherapy,
the lot of persons with epilepsy in the workplace
may be improving, despite suboptimal implementation of antidiscrimination laws. Aside from providing effective treatment of seizures, physicians
may be especially helpful to epileptic workers by
counseling them about appropriate vocations and,
with the consent of the workers, by informing employers about the workers’ suitability for particular
types of employment or about what types of restrictions should be imposed. Where employers engage
in discriminatory practices, physicians may play a
central role in establishing that an epileptic person
is qualified for a particular job and.help lay a foundation for a legal action to enforce a right to fair
employment.
J

Antidiscrimination laws
Federal and state statutes declare it unlawful for
employers t o discriminate against handicapped persons (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 19856). Epilepsy generally qualifies as a handicapping condition under these laws, even if the epileptic is
seizure-free and has a normal neurological examination. Moreover, under the federal rehabilitation
act (1973)that applies to employers who receive various forms of federal support, mere belief by the
employer that a person is handicapped counts as a
handicap for purposes of triggering the enforcement
sections of the law. These forbid employers from
firing or refusing to hire handicapped persons who
are “otherwise qualified” for a particular job solely
on the basis of the perceived handicap. Although
the federal law is a potentially powerful weapon
against discrimination, it may not be a simple matter
to prove its application. A claimant must not only
establish that he or she is both handicapped and
qualified, but also must show that the employer’s
decision not to hire or to fire rested only on the
existence of the particular handicap (e.g., epilepsy).

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EPILEPSY

In the Arline case (1987), the U.S.Supreme Court
considered the application of the federal antidiscrimination law to a person who was classified by her
employer as unqualified because of the employer’s
arguably unfounded fears that she posed a risk to
others. The Epilepsy Foundation of America filed
an amicus brief because of its interest in assuring
that epileptic persons not be denied employment because of unfounded fears about their condition. In
Arline, a public school teacher with a past history
of recurrent tuberculosis was fired solely because
the school board feared she might be contagious. In
her suit against the school board for discriminatory
firing, she asserted that, while her history of tuberculosis constituted a handicap, she was currently
qualified to teach, and that the board’s denying her
a teaching position was based solely on her handicap. The school board justified the firing by arguing
that her potential contagiousness made her unqualified to teach. The U.S. solicitor general intervened
on behalf of the school board arguing that, since
federal law or regulations did not expressly define
handicap to include . a contagious disease, the
teacher was not entitled to claim under the antidiscrimination law. The Supreme Court concluded that
her tuberculosis could be viewed as a handicap, expressly rejecting the notion that infectious illnesses
were excluded from the coverage of the law, and
declared that the law forbade her firing solely on the
basis of her handicap. It emphasized that one purpose of the law was to prevent discrimination based
on prejudice or ignorance, and remanded the case
back to the federal district court for a particularized
determination, based on “reasonable medical judgments,” as to whether her potential for transmitting
tuberculosis was such as to affect her qualifications
to teach in a classroom.
This decision affirms the principle that employers
offend against antidiscriminationlaws when they invoke concerns unrelated to a handicapped person’s
ability to do a given job as a reason for denying
access to that job. It also highlights the great importance of medical data for individualized determinations of a handicapped person’s capabilities or
potential dangerousness. As to persons with epilepsy, relevant factors include the nature of seizures, degree of control of seizures with antiepileptic drugs, compliance with prescribed therapy,
adverse reactions to antiepileptics, and extent of
any neurological impairment. Findings relating to
these factors will indicate what employment is appropriate, and will provide a basis for evaluating
whether an employer’s decision to fire or refuse to
hire was related to the person’s qualifications or
f
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solely to his or her epilepsy. Even if a handicap such
as epilepsy disqualifies a person from a particular
job, an employer also has a duty to make a reasonable accommodation to the handicap, such as offering a position for which the person is qualified.
For example, in the recent Smith case (1987), a federal court decided that a public transportation company was not required to allow an epileptic employee to operate a trolley car, even if antiepileptics
were prescribed, and that it made a reasonable accommodation by offering the employee a clerical
position. It is thus evident that physicians can both
assist their epileptic patients in asserting a right to
nondiscriminatory employment and assist employers in making appropriate job placements.
The “epilepsy defense”
Treiman (1986) has recently reviewed the issue of
ictal violence, noting an apparent rise in cases where
persons charged with crimes have claimed their alleged misconduct derived from epilepsy and not
from criminal intent. Defendants invoke this socalled “epilepsy defense” to undercut the prosecution’s assertion that they knowingly and willingly
committed a criminal act. Because the prosecution
must ordinarily prove all elements of a crime beyond
a reasonable doubt, including intent to commit a
crime, evidence that a defendant acted involuntarily
or with less than full awareness may lead a jury to
conclude that the defendant lacked criminal intent
(or mens rea).
Recent litigation in New York exemplifies a defendant’s successful use of the “epilepsy defense.”
Mutter of Torsney (1979) involved a policeman who,
without apparent provocation, shot and killed a 15year-old boy. He pleaded a defense of “mental illness” to a charge of murder. At his trial, a defense
psychiatrist testified that the shooting either occurred during a psychomotor seizure or as part of
a “psychosis associated with epilepsy.” Despite
lack of a previous history of epilepsy and the opinions of neurologists that he did ‘not have epilepsy,
a jury found him not guilty. The court then committed him to a mental hospital, but there neither
the examining psychiatrists or neurologists found
evidence of mental illness or epilepsy. After a hearing in which further medical evidence was presented
that he had neither epilepsy nor diagnosable mental
illness, New York’s highest court ordered his release. It reasoned that because there was no proof
of mental illness, no justification existed for confining him under a statute that requires proof of both
mental illness and dangerousness as conditions of
involuntary detention. A vigorous dissent argued

Epilepsia, Vol. 29, Suppl. 2, 1988
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that the combination of an “explosive” personality
and the specific violent act justified continuing involuntary hospitalization.
The Torsney case underscores the question of
whether violence directed at a particular person can
be interpreted as an ictal event. If it can, invoking
epilepsy as a basis for limiting or avoiding criminal
liability seems an appropriate legal strategy, especially if a defendant has epilepsy and a particular
violent act was paroxysmal and incompatible with
his usual behavior. However, despite studies indicating an increased prevalence of epilepsy among
criminal populations and anecdotes of ictal violence
(Mark and Ervin, 1970; Ashford et al., 1980; Pincus,
1981), it is uncertain if directed ictal violence ever
occurs. Delgado-Escueta el al. (1981) recently evaluated 19 subjects with a history of suspected ictal
violence by closed circuit television and constant
monitoring of EEG. During the study, 13 exhibited
aggression during documented seizures, including
shouting, spitting, kicking, screaming, assaultive
posturing, and destruction of property. None exhibited moderate or severe directed violence, and
only one was aggressive towards a particular person. All subjects were amnesic for the aggressive
episodes, and the episodes themselves were typically sudden, stereotyped, unsustained, and never
embodied a “consecutive series of purposeful
movements.” From these data, the investigators
suggested five criteria for determining if a violent
act was an ictal event: diagnosis of epilepsy by a
competent specialist, documentation of automatisms by closed-circuit television and biotelemetry,
verification of aggressive conduct during documented seizure, history that observed violence was
characteristic of a person’s previous seizures, and
judgment by a competent specialist that the act was
in fact part of a seizure.
If these criteria are rigidly applied, it seems likely
that few, if any, episodes of directed violence would
be classified as ictal events. While those testifying
on behalf of a defendant who has pleaded the “epilepsy defense” may advance less rigorous criteria,
data from this study provide a useful framework for
courts to apply in evaluating an assertion that a specific violent act derived from epilepsy. However,
convincing as these data are on the general question
of ictal violence, they can never be conclusive on
the issue of whether a particular act by a particular
defendant was or was not related to epilepsy. This
is an issue that must finally be resolved by a court,
taking into account the evidence offered by the medical witnesses of the opposing parties (Beresford,
1980).

W e p s i a . Vol. 29, Suppl. 2. 1988

PHYSICIAN AS TARGET OF SOCIAL
CONTROL
Malpractice liability
Physicians caring for epileptic patients may become defendants in malpractice litigation by various
routes. As indicated in the Duvall(l984) and Freese
(1973) cases, these include allegedly negligent failure to diagnose or treat epilepsy or failure to provide
appropriate information concerning particular therapeutic decisions. The legal rules that govern malpractice proceedings are straightforward: a claimant
must show that it was more probable than not that
the physician-defendant failed to observe reasonable or accepted standards of medical practice and
that this failure caused quantifiable harm to the
claimant. Application of the rules is not so straightforward, however. There may be conflicting testimony from medical “experts” on whether a defendant acted reasonably, and it may be exceedingly
difficult to decide whether it was the allegedly unreasonable conduct or the disorder itself that produced a particular harm. Moreover, once negligent
causation of harm is established, it may be difficult
to ascertain what is the proper measure of recoverable damages. For these reasons and because some
malpractice claims are in themselves tenuous
or baseless, claimants in the aggregate are more
likely to lose than win a malpractice suit (Danzon,
1984).
Hurbeson v Parke Davis (1983) illustrates the pivotal impact of expert testimony in a malpractice case
and how a court may determine damages in the context of its own-social vision. The suit involved a
claim by a woman with epilepsy that her physicians
negligently failed to warn her of the risks of taking
Dilantin during pregnancy. When she asked her
physicians about these risks, they mentioned cleft
palate and hirsutism but not the so-called “fetal hydantoin syndrome.” She later bore two children that
her medical expert testified had this syndrome. He
also testified that this syndrome was a known risk
of Dilantin that should have been disclosed to a
pregnant woman taking the drug. The Washington
supreme court concluded that it was malpractice to
omit this disclosure, and upheld liability for both
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life.” In calculating damages for “wrongful life,” it decided that the
children were entitled to recover amounts sufficient
to meet the lifetime costs of care attributable to their
affliction. However, it rejected an allowance for
“pain and suffering,” in part because of the problem
of quantifying an award based on comparing a miserable life with no life at all. It justified its overall
1
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finding of liability by the need to encourage proper
genetic counseling and provide a “comprehensive
and consistent deterrent to malpractice.”
This case offers several lessons. One is obvious:
the dialogue between epileptics and their physicians
about the risks of anticonvulsant therapy has profound legal implications. It must not be perfunctory
and must address the particular situation of the patient. Another is that in the rush to condemn lawyers
for their role in malpractice litigation, physicians
should not overlook the fact that no claimant prevails unless a medical professional ventures an opinion that the physician-defendant was negligent and
that this negligence caused harm. Moreover, this
opinion must be so persuasive that, despite contrary
testimony by a defendant’s medical witnesses, a
court will accept it as the most reasonable assessment of a disputed event. Thus, loss of a malpractice
suit implies that both some professional peers and
a court have found negligence. However, perhaps
the most consequential lesson is the court’s perception that awards of damages not only compensate injured persons but encourage better practice.
The notion that the threat of later financial loss deters physicians and others from socially unacceptable conduct lies at the heart of expanding formulations of tort liability and the general sharp rise in
costs of liability insurance.
Liability to third parties
While physicians can readily appreciate that their
epileptic patients will risk harm to themselves by
noncompliance with recommended treatments or
other self-defeating behaviors, it is less easy to envision the risks of these behaviors to third parties.
The most evident of these latter risks is driving in
the face of uncontrolled or uncontrollable seizures.
As previously noted, state laws generally seek to
assure that epileptic persons or their physicians report to drivers’ licensing agencies so that the agencies can impose appropriate restrictions on driving.
If such reporting is complete and accurate, it would
seem that physicians should be free from any responsibility for whatever harms their patients cause
while d ~ v i n g But
.
suppose state law requires that
the patient report, that in fact no report is made,
and that the patient drives in the face of continuing
seizures. Is there a situation in which the physician
might be held legally responsible for injuries to third
parties resulting from a seizure the patient experiences while driving?
One such scenario might arise where the physician fails to prescribe appropriate antiepileptic
drugs or fails to advise the patient of the risks of
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driving until it is known that seizures are controllable. In the Duvull case (1984), persons injured in
an accident caused by an epileptic person’s seizure
brought suit against his physician. They alleged that
the physician had failed to provide treatment and
had failed to warn of the risks of driving without
taking medications, and that these omissions violated a duty the physician owed to them as members
of the general public. The trial judge dismissed the
suit, but the appeals court reversed this ruling. It
concluded that the doctor-patient relationship imposed a duty on the physician to take reasonable
steps to control the dangerous conduct of his patient, and that if the physician should have foreseen
that failing to treat his patient’s epilepsy or warning
him not to drive risked harm to other drivers, he
could be found liable to the injured claimants. The
court did not find the physician liable; it simply concluded that the theory of liability was valid. Accordingly, the case was sent back to the trial court
for further proceedings. Whatever the final disposition in this case, it shows that under some circumstances, law will impose on physicians a duty to
protect persons whose interests are threatened by
their patients.
The implications of creating such a duty were explored in the now famous Tarusoffcase (1976). The
court clearly recognized the potential conflict with
a physician’s duty to protect medical privacy or confidentiality, but concluded that a physician’s duty
to warn a particular person whom he knew to be
endangered outweighed his duty to respect confidentiality. Scholarly criticism of the result in Turasoff emphasized that requiring physicians to act in
this way will only dissuade potentially dangerous
patients from seeking or cooperating in medical care
and will ultimately increase the risks to society
(Stone, 1976). This critique seems especially relevant to the situation of the epileptic driver, effective
management of whom depends heavily on a willingness to seek and follow medical advice (Masland,
1978). Although the Turusaffdoctrine has not been
widely adopted, the Michigan court accepted its rationale in the Duvull case (1984) by creating a duty
running from an epileptic’s physician to third parties. Thus, even if state law requires reporting by
epileptic persons and not by their physicians, the
physician who knows that an epileptic patient is
driving, despite uncontrolled seizures and despite
the physician’s warnings not to do. so, and who fails
to take reasonable steps to prevent public harm may
be vulnerable under the Tarusoffdoctrine. One reasonable step for a physician to take is to notify the
state licensing agency or local police department

H . R . BERESFORD
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and leave to that agency the matter of enforcing
restrictions on driving.
Nonconsensual reporting of this nature is a clear
breach of medical confidentiality, and questions
emerge about the potential liability of the physician
who acts in this way. One threat is that the patient
might sue for invasion of privacy. Another is that
disclosure may violate state laws or regulations that
protect communications between patients and physicians. As indicated in Tarusoff and the accompanying debate, however, the legal system will tolerate violations of confidentiality that entail good
faith efforts to protect the public and are proportionate to the degree of risk involved. Nevertheless,
any nonconsensual disclosure of confidential information should rest on competent legal advice.
A less complicated but still significant risk to the
physician of an epileptic driver relates to the adverse effects of antiepileptic drugs. It is general
knowledge that many of these drugs are potentially
intoxicating, and it is foreseeable that they may adversely affect the capabilities to operate motor
vehicles. Thus, if a patient has a motor vehicle accident because of antiepileptic drug-induced intoxication, both the patient and third parties may have
a sustainable claim against the prescribing physician
for injuries incurred in the accident if they can prove
that an inappropriate drug or dosage of drug was
prescribed, or that the physician failed to advise of
the risk of sedation or failed to monitor treatment
appropriately. The prospect of liability would be
much diminished if the patient had been informed
of the risks of sedation and the physician had monitored blood levels of antiepileptic drugs in an appropriate fashion.
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Discussion

Question: Are there any federal guidelines or regulations that apply to interstate truckers with epilepsy ?
Dr. Beresford: Yes, although I’mnot familiar with
them in detail. They are regulations, not statutes.

Most of the original licensure that makes persons
eligible to drive is handled on a state-by-state basis,
and there are special provisions for chauffeurs’,
public conveyance, and trucking licenses. I am just
not familiar with the details.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EPILEPSY
Question: Would you comment on a physician’s
liability should antiepileptic drugs not be prescribed
for someone at low risk for seizure recurrence, for
example, a single seizure, and such a patient subsequently has a seizure that engenders risk or actual
damage to himself or someone else?
Dr. Beresford: The standard in a malpractice suit
is that a physician’s conduct must be shown to have
deviated from reasonable or accepted standards of
medical practice. If the balance of the evidence is
that it is reasonable or accepted practice not to treat
a single seizure, then the physician’s risk of liability
is small.
The problem with the malpractice suit, however,
is that one gets into a battle of experts. In the rush
by physicians to condemn lawyers and judges for
what has happened in the court liability system, they
sometimes forget that physicians are involved there
as well, and that it is physicians who come into court
and testify. Typically, it is the plaintiffs physician
who is going to make or break the case. Because of
this, one cannot give a doctrinaire answer. It seems
to me, though, that with standard9 of practice evolving in favor of not treating single seizures under
many circumstances, it is a perfectly good defense
should the issue come up.
Dr. Pedley: There are a number of questions for
Dr. Beresford that I am not going to ask because
they relate to very particular circumstances, nor will
I ask advice about when this or that patient can
drive. I think the answers are so specific to the particular circumstances, and so variable from state to
state, that it really would not be appropriate to devote time to this. I refer you to your own attorneys
who can advise you in light of what is relevant in
your own state.
Question: Based on one of the cases you discussed, do you recommend that physicians use specific terms such as “fetal hydantoin syndrome”
when discussing teratogenic risks of antiepileptic
drugs?
Dr. Beresford: In a way, it is kind of unfortunate
I used that particular case because of the factual
question about whether that entity actually exists
or is even an appropriate type of diagnosis. It has
always seemed to me that the most important thing
about informed consent is the quality of the dia-
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logue, and the fact that the dialogue is documented
in the medical record. When one lists 99 things that
may go wrong but does not list the 100th thing, and
it is then the 100th thing that actually happens, it
has always struck me as wrong that this then becomes a basis for liability.
In response specifically to your question, it seems
to me that if one concludes that there is no such
thing as fetal hydantoin syndromes but rather a variety of fetal effects that can occur with a number
of antiepileptic drugs (and this seems to be the
evolving view), then I do not think it is necessary
to disclose it.
Dr. Leppik: From a medical standpoint, I do what
our local lawyers have advised me to do. That is, I
bring up the issue of possible drug-related teratogenic effects with any woman of childbearing age
and potential. I agree that the importance is not that
you cover every conceivable complication, but that
a discussion is initiated that indicates there are some
risks associated with treatment. I also say that I
think the risks are outweighed by the benefits of the
treatment.
I also make sure that patients have plenty of opportunity to ask questions and open up to me about
particular concerns they have, or have been advised
about. Finally, I give them a written handout of
some material that I prepared that goes over this
issue in a general way. I fully agreed with Dr. Beresford that the idea of having to list every possible
complication is very counterproductive.
Question: Have recent changes resulting in increased flexibility for epileptic patients’ obtaining
licensure, for example, Maryland’s recent reduction
in length of time required for seizure control to 3
months, resulted in any increased number of accidents, injuries, or litigation from seizure-related accidents?
Dr. Beresford: Not that I am aware of.
Question: Are there any legal implications for
physicians who prescribe generic brands of antiepileptic drugs as opposed. to brand names?
Dr. Beresford: The only implication would be if
there is convincing evidence that the generic drug
is inferior. This is one of those fact questions. It
goes back to the state of the medical evidence.
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